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Controversies exist regarding: (a) the relationships between perceptual and conceptual
activities and (b) the format and neuro-anatomical substrates of concepts. Some authors
maintain that concepts are represented in the brain in a propositional, abstract way, which
is totally unrelated to the sensory-motor functions of the brain. Other authors argue that
concepts are represented in the same format in which they are constructed by the sensory-
motor system and can be considered as activity patterns distributed across different
perceptual and motor domains. The present paper examines two groups of investigations
that support the second view. Particular attention is given to the role of body movements
and somatosensory inputs in the representation of artifacts and, respectively, of visual and
other perceptual sources of knowledge in the construction of biological categories. The
first group of studies aimed to assess the weight of various kinds of information in the
representation of different conceptual categories by asking normal subjects to subjectively
evaluate the role of various perceptual, motor, and encyclopedic sources of knowledge in
the construction of different semantic categories.The second group of studies investigated
the neuro-anatomical correlates of various types of categorical disorders.These last inves-
tigations showed that the cortical areas damaged in patients with a disorder selectively
affecting a given category have a critical role in processing the information that has con-
tributed most to constructing the affected category. Both lines of research suggest that
body movements and somatosensory information have a major role in the representation
of actions and artifacts mainly known through manipulations and other actions, whereas
visual and other perceptual information has a dominant role in the representation of animals
and other living things.
Keywords: models of conceptual knowledge, category-specific semantic disorders, animals vs. fruits and vegeta-
bles, sources of knowledge, anterior temporal lobes, left fronto-parietal lesions
INTRODUCTION
Our knowledge of the world is mediated by two types of activity:
(1) perceptual-motor activity, which allows us to obtain informa-
tion about external objects through our actions or analysis of the
perceptual attributes of environmental stimuli; and (2) conceptual
activity, which permits the construction of internal representa-
tions of complex categories of knowledge. Two points must be
stressed regarding this basic distinction. First, objects we know
mainly through actions accomplished by our body only partly
overlap with those we principally know through auditory and
visual modalities. The former usually belong to the category of
artifacts that can be touched, manipulated and used for different
purposes, whereas the latter often belong to living categories (such
as wild animals) we know in a physical or virtual environment
located in far extra-personal space. The second point refers to the
fact that until recently there was an important gap between our
knowledge of the mechanisms and neuro-anatomical substrates
of perceptual and motor activities and respectively of conceptual
activities. Indeed, we have clear and detailed knowledge about the
organization and neuro-anatomical structures subsuming actions
or different perceptual modalities, but we have only controver-
sial and uncertain models about the format and neuro-anatomical
substrates of concepts.
Concerning the format of conceptual representations, many
cognitive models (e.g., Phylyshyn, 1973; Fodor, 1975 and, more
recently, Humphreys and Riddoch, 1988; Riddoch et al., 1988;
Caramazza et al., 1990; Patterson and Hodges, 2000; Coccia et al.,
2004) have claimed that perceptual and conceptual activities result
from the activity of interrelated but completely independent
systems.
According to this view, the hierarchical stages of perceptual
analysis proceed up to the level of structural description, which
includes a complete three-dimensional specification of the sen-
sory characteristics of objects. But after this level, no trace of
the previous sensory-motor mechanisms persists because the for-
mat of conceptual representations accessed through these struc-
tural descriptions is considered abstract, amodal, and propo-
sitional. Nevertheless, subsequent to the pioneering work of
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Kolers and Brison (1984), Allport (1985), and Jackendoff (1987),
an increasing number of authors have refuted this model of
an abstract, amodal conceptual/semantic system. These authors
maintain that conceptual representations keep the stamp of the
perceptual mechanisms through which they were formed and are
stored in the same format in which they were constructed. Draw-
ing in part on these cognitive models and in part on Hebb’s (1949)
model of “cell assemblies,” Damasio (1989, 1990) proposed the
dynamic “higher-order convergence zone” construct. This con-
struct assumes that concept retrieval results from a process of
recollection of modality-specific bits of memories, stored near the
sensory portals and motor output sites of the system and trig-
gered by firing in “higher-order convergence zones” (Damasio’s,
1989, 1990). This construct was further developed by Barsalou
(Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003), who added the similarity-
in-topography (SIT) principle to Damasio’s model. According to
this model, the proximity of two conjunctive neurons in a conver-
gence zone increases with the similarity of the features they con-
join. Consequently, conjunctive neurons become topographically
organized into local regions that represent properties and cate-
gories. Both Damasio’s and Barsalou’s models can be considered
eminent examples of “embodied cognitive models,” whose central
tenet is that semantic knowledge is grounded in sensory-motor
systems that are automatically engaged during online concep-
tual processing, re-enacting modality-specific patterns of activity
normally evoked during perception and action.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THIS SECTION
The format of conceptual representations is the object of a strong
debate between authors who maintain that concepts are repre-
sented in a propositional, abstract manner in the brain and authors
who argue that concepts are represented in the same format in
which they are constructed by the sensory-motor system. Some
models are discussed that specify how sensory-motor information
could converge in the construction of a conceptual representation.
THE DISCOVERY OF CATEGORY-SPECIFIC SEMANTIC
DISORDERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE DEBATE BETWEEN
SUPPORTERS OF THE ABSTRACT AND THE EMBODIED
FORMAT OF CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS
One important development in the debate between supporters
of the “abstract/amodal” and “embodied/sensory-motor” format
of conceptual representations was the discovery that disruptions
of conceptual knowledge are not necessarily homogeneous across
categories but are sometimes “category-specific” (Warrington and
McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington and Shallice, 1984). Category-
specific semantic disorders usually affect biological (“living”)
more than artifact (“non-living”) categories, but sometimes pref-
erentially impair artifact (“non-living”) categories (see Saffran and
Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Gainotti, 2000, 2005; Capi-
tani et al., 2003 for reviews). In any case, they have been explained
differently by supporters of the abstract and the embodied format
of conceptual representations.
In particular, Warrington and co-workers (Warrington, 1975,
1981; Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington and
Shallice, 1984) claimed that their patients’ semantic disorders
did not respect the boundaries between living/biological and
non-living/artifact entities (e.g., the representation of “body parts”
tended to be disrupted together with that of artifact categories,
whereas the representation of “musical instruments” tended to be
disrupted with that of living items). This suggested that “category-
specific semantic disorders” might not be due to the disruption
of true “biological” and “artifact” categories, but might be the
by-products of a more basic dichotomy concerning the differ-
ential weighting of visual-perceptual and functional attributes
in the representation of biological and, respectively, artifact cat-
egories. This interpretation is obviously at variance with the views
of authors who claim that the format of conceptual representa-
tions is abstract, amodal, and propositional. In fact, these authors
(e.g., Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Capitani
et al., 2003; Caramazza and Mahon, 2003) proposed a very dif-
ferent theoretical interpretation of category-specific semantic dis-
orders. They hypothesized an “innate” categorical organization
of conceptual knowledge in which category-specific impairments
for animals, plant life and artifacts are due to the disruption of
innate brain networks shaped by natural selection for rapid iden-
tification of objects that are very important for survival. This
interpretation is more consistent with the model of an abstract,
propositional semantic system (because all the above-mentioned
categories could be represented in the same abstract format) but
fails to explain the joint breakdown of artifacts with body parts
(see McCarthy, 1995; Gainotti, 2000, 2004; Hart and Kraut, 2007
for reviews) and musical instruments with living items (see Dixon
et al., 2000; Gainotti, 2000; Masullo et al., 2012 for reviews).
The present review examines two different groups of inves-
tigation that support the “embodied/sensory-motor” model of
conceptual representations, devoting particular attention, on one
hand, to the role of body movements and somatosensory inputs
and, on the other hand, to that of visual and other perceptual
sources of knowledge in the construction of different semantic
categories.
The first group includes studies that evaluated the weight of
various kinds of information in the representation of different
conceptual categories by asking normal subjects to subjectively
evaluate the role of various perceptual, motor, and encyclopedic
sources of knowledge in constructing different living and artifact
categories.
The second group includes studies concerned with the neuro-
anatomical correlates of various types of category-specific distur-
bances, because it is important to check for consistency between
the cortical areas damaged in patients with a disorder selectively
affecting a given category and the specific functions these areas
have in processing information that contributes to the construc-
tion of the affected category. In order to facilitate the comprehen-
sion of these rather hard issues, Table 1, reporting an overview
and clustering of the main findings of the present survey has been
included.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THIS SECTION
The discovery of category-specific semantic disorders for living
things and artifacts has strongly influenced the debate between
supporters of the abstract and the sensory-motor format of con-
ceptual representations. Warrington and co-workers maintained
that category-specific semantic disorders were not due to the
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Table 1 | Overview of the main findings of the present review.
Aims To survey two different groups of investigations supporting the view that concepts are represented in the brain in the
same format in which they are constructed by the sensory-motor system.
The first group includes studies in which normal subjects were asked to subjectively evaluate the relevance of various
perceptual, motor, and encyclopaedic sources of knowledge in the construction of different living and artefact categories.
The second group includes studies that investigated the neuro-anatomical correlates of category-specific disorders for
various types of living and artefact categories. The aim of these investigations consisted in assessing if the cortical areas
damaged in patients with a disorder selectively affecting a given category have a critical role in processing the
information that mainly contributed to the construction of that category.
Results of the first
group of investigations
Studies consistently show: (a) that visual information is evaluated as the dominant feature in both living and artefact
categories; and (b) that the next most relevant source of information consists of other perceptual data for the biological
categories and of body-related features (i.e. actions and somatosensory data) for the artefact categories.
These data suggest that the greatest difference between living and non-living categories is not the prominent role played
by vision in the representation of biological entities and functional features in the representation of artifacts. Instead, the
greatest difference is in the interaction between visual data and other perceptual attributes in the case of living beings
and between visual data and action-related properties in the case of artifacts.
Results of the second
group of investigations
These studies show that in patients with a category-specific semantic disorder for biological entities, lesions bilaterally
affect the anterior parts of the temporal lobes (where the ventral stream of visual processing converges with auditory,
olfactory, and gustatory inputs).
On the contrary, in patients with a preferential impairment of the artifact categories lesions usually affect the left-sided
fronto-parietal, sensory-motor cortices (where the dorsal stream of visual processing converges with body-related and
action-oriented structures).
Taken together, both lines of research suggest that body movements and somatosensory information have a major role in
the representation of artifacts, whereas visual and other perceptual information have a dominant role in the
representation of animals and other living entities.
Conclusion The principle assuming that concepts are represented in the brain in the same format in which they are constructed by
the sensory-motor system is consistent with the subjective evaluation of normal subjects and the main functions of the
cortical areas affected in patients with disorders specifically affecting these conceptual categories.
disruption of true “biological” and “artifact” categories but were
the by-product of a more basic dichotomy concerning the dif-
ferent weight of visual-perceptual and functional attributes in
the representation of biological and, respectively, artifact cate-
gories. Supporters of the abstract models counter-argued that
category-specific impairments for animals, plant life and artifacts
are not due to the loss of specific clusters of sensory-motor infor-
mation but reflect an innate categorical organization shaped by
natural selection to support rapid identification of objects impor-
tant for survival. The present review examines two groups of
investigations that support the sensory-motor model of concep-
tual representations. It takes into account, on one hand, studies
conducted in normal subjects, to evaluate the weight of various
kinds of information in the representation of different conceptual
categories and, on the other hand, studies that investigated the
neuro-anatomical correlates of various types of category-specific
disorders.
STUDIES THAT ASSESSED THE WEIGHT OF VARIOUS KINDS
OF INFORMATION IN THE REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT
CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES
The view that semantic knowledge is not stored in an amodal,
abstract format in the brain, but in the same concrete for-
mat in which it was constructed by the sensory-motor system,
was prompted by a series of seminal papers by Warrington and
co-workers (Warrington, 1975, 1981; Warrington and McCarthy,
1983, 1987; Warrington and Shallice, 1984). These papers sug-
gested (a) that different brain lesions can disrupt different cate-
gories of knowledge (e.g., living beings vs. artifacts); and (b) that
these “category-specific disorders” are not due to the disruption
of an innate categorical brain organization but to disorganiza-
tion of the sensory-motor mechanisms that primarily contributed
to the development of different categories (i.e., the “differential
weighting hypothesis”). In particular, Warrington and Shallice
(1984) described four patients recovering from herpes simplex
encephalitis (HSE) who presented a dissociation between a selec-
tive impairment for living things and a relative sparing of artifacts.
They believed that the dissociation was due to the major role of
visual features in the identification of living things and func-
tional features in the identification of artifacts. The lesions in
HSE selectively affect the anterior parts of the temporal lobes,
where the ventral stream of visual processing terminates (Unger-
leider and Mishkin, 1982; Mishkin et al., 1984; Goodale et al.,
1991). Therefore, Warrington and Shallice (1984) proposed that
these structures have a critical role in the construction of liv-
ing categories because they subsume the high-level visual data
on which distinctions among members of the “living” categories
are based. According to this view, the distinction between a lion,
a tiger, and a leopard would depend on a visual sensory feature,
namely, the plain, striped, or spotted aspect of their skin; in the
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case of artifacts, however, identification of a category member
would depend on functional attributes (i.e., the subtly different
functions man designed them for). This interpretation, which is
usually called the “sensory-functional theory” (SFT; Caramazza
and Shelton, 1998; Tyler et al., 2000; Capitani et al., 2003; Ven-
tura et al., 2005), prompted studies in various areas of research in
brain-damaged patients and normal subjects that reported con-
flicting results (see Capitani et al., 2003; Gainotti et al., 2009 for
reviews). For example, the disproportionate impairment of visual
(rather than functional) attributes predicted by the SFT in patients
with a category-specific semantic impairment for living things was
confirmed in some patients (e.g., Sartori and Job, 1988; De Renzi
and Lucchelli, 1994; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Rosazza et al., 2003)
but not in others (see Capitani et al., 2003 for survey). Moreover,
the assumption of differential weighting of sensory and functional
information in the representation of knowledge about living things
and artifacts has not been systematically confirmed by studies con-
ducted in normal subjects, using various experimental procedures,
which will be described later.
These conflicting results are probably due to the inappropri-
ateness of the expression “SFT” to account for the “differential
weighting” hypothesis, because both “functional” and “sensory”
features include very heterogeneous components. Based on the
suggestion of Warrington and McCarthy (1987), Buxbaum et al.
(2000), Buxbaum and Saffran (2002), and Boronat et al. (2005)
distinguished, within the functional knowledge, the function of
an object from its manipulation. They suggested that, because the
“manipulation” is related to a sensory-motor activity, manipula-
tion might be the component most tightly linked to the “differ-
ential weighting hypothesis”. The above-cited studies showed that
also the properties subsumed by the term “sensory” are heteroge-
neous, because different types of sensory data might have different
weights in the construction of different semantic categories. Thus,
visual perception could have a leading role in the mental represen-
tation of animals and somatosensory data in that of tools. These
facts prompted various authors (e.g., Gainotti, 1990, 2006; Saffran
and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Chao et al., 1999; Chao
and Martin, 2000; Martin et al., 2000; Martin and Chao, 2001; Mar-
tin, 2007) to replace the expression “SFT” with the more specific
“sensory-motor model of conceptual knowledge” (SMCK), which,
in keeping with Barsalou et al.’s (2003) “embodied cognition the-
ory,” assumes that various perceptual, motor and encyclopedic
sources of knowledge have different weights in the construction
of different living and artifact categories.
The assumption that various kinds of sensory information
may have different weights in the representation of different cat-
egories of knowledge has been confirmed by studies conducted
in normal subjects (following the principles of the SFT and the
SMCK) to evaluate their mental representations of the sources of
knowledge in these categories. Farah and McClelland (1991) and
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) were the first authors who tried
to assess the weight of various kinds of information in the rep-
resentation of different conceptual categories in normal subjects.
Following the principles of the SFT, they asked participants to
underline either visual or functional descriptors in dictionary defi-
nitions of living things or artifacts. The results of these studies were
conflicting. Farah and McClelland (1991) found a much larger
ratio of visual than functional attributes for living things than
for artifacts, whereas Caramazza and Shelton (1998) only found a
non-significant difference between these two domains of knowl-
edge. This discrepancy emerged because in the former study a
property was considered“functional”only if it described“what the
item did or what it was for,”whereas in the latter all“non-sensorial”
(i.e., functional, encyclopedic, etc.) descriptors were contrasted
with sensory properties. Analogous inconsistencies emerged in
studies conducted by Devlin et al. (1998), Tyler et al. (2000), Gar-
rard et al. (2001), McRae and Cree (2002), Vanovenberghe and
Storms (2003), Ventura et al. (2005), and Zannino et al. (2006),
when feature generation or feature verification tasks were used
to check the assumption of differential weighting of sensory and
functional information in the representation of knowledge about
living things and artifacts.
Tranel et al. (1997b),Vigliocco et al. (2004), McRae et al. (2005),
Gainotti et al. (2009),Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (under review),
and Gainotti et al. (2012) obtained more consistent results using
different procedures to test the principles of the “SMCK.” Tranel
et al. (1997b) asked normal subjects who had been shown slides
of entities from different conceptual categories to rate the extent
to which a number of factors, including manipulability and var-
ious sensory modalities, had been part of their experience with
the corresponding objects. Vigliocco et al. (2004) and McRae et al.
(2005) gathered data on conceptual feature representations from
the conceptual domains of objects and actions, by asking under-
graduate students to list the features of the things the stimulus
words referred to. They distinguished (in the object field) sev-
eral categories of living things and artifacts and classified the
features in five categories: visual, other perceptual, functional,
action-related, and other (including superordinate and encyclo-
pedic). Gainotti et al. (2009, 2012) and Hoffman and Lambon
Ralph (under review) used a procedure that was more directly
and specifically derived from the “SMCK.” This procedure con-
sisted of asking normal subjects to use Likert scales to evaluate the
influence of different perceptual (visual, auditory, tactual, olfac-
tory, and gustative) and motor activities, as well as encyclopedic
information, in the mental representation of living and artifact
categories.
The same results were consistently found in all of these investi-
gations using both feature-listing tasks and Likert scales to evaluate
the weight of different “sources of knowledge.”
First, visual information was consistently evaluated with both
methodologies as the dominant type of sensory or motor
feature by averaging results obtained across all concepts and
comparing the scores for each modality (Tranel et al., 1997b;
Cree and McRae, 2003; Vigliocco et al., 2004; McRae et al.,
2005; Gainotti et al., 2009; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph,
under review). The major importance attributed to vision
in the mental representation of all kinds of concrete enti-
ties is not surprising if we consider that most of our knowl-
edge of the world is obtained through this perceptual modal-
ity.
Second, when hierarchical cluster analyzes were used in feature-
listing studies (e.g., Cree and McRae, 2003; Vigliocco et al., 2004)
or in studies based on a separate rating of the various sources
of knowledge (e.g., Gainotti et al., 2009, 2012; Hoffman and
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Lambon Ralph, under review), a tripartite organization of knowl-
edge (with three major clusters corresponding to animals, fruits
and vegetables, and artifacts) was found.
Third, the distinction between living things and artifacts,
on one hand, and “animals” and “plant life” (within the “liv-
ing” categories), on the other hand, was confirmed by a more
detailed analysis of the next most relevant sources of infor-
mation after vision. In fact, the next most relevant sources of
information consisted of other perceptual data (and encyclope-
dic information) for the living categories but of body-related
features (actions and somatosensory data) for the artifact cate-
gories. Furthermore, within the “living” categories the next most
relevant sources of information included encyclopedic knowl-
edge and auditory perceptions (i.e., typical sounds) in animals,
whereas they consisted of olfactory and gustatory perceptions
and actions (e.g., peeling, cutting, and stirring) in fruits and
vegetables.
Taken together, these data suggest that the greatest differ-
ence between living and artifact categories lies in the interaction
between visual data and other perceptual (auditory, olfactory, gus-
tatory, and tactual) attributes in the case of living things, and
between visual data, action-related properties, and somatosensory
information in the case of artifacts. The greatest difference between
living and artifact categories does, therefore, not lie in the promi-
nent role played by vision in the representation of animals, fruits,
and vegetables, and by functional features in the representation of
artifacts.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THIS SECTION
Warrington and co-workers’ “SFT” has not been systematically
confirmed by studies conducted in normal subjects using var-
ious experimental procedures. Conflicting results may be due
to the inappropriateness of the expression “SFT,” because both
“functional” and “sensory” features include very heterogeneous
components. Indeed, the expression has been replaced with the
more specific “SMCK,” which assumes that various perceptual,
motor and encyclopedic sources of knowledge have different
weights in the construction of different living and artifact cat-
egories. The usefulness of this new model has been confirmed
in studies performed to assess the weight of various kinds of
information in the representation of different conceptual cat-
egories by asking normal subjects to subjectively evaluate the
role of various sources of knowledge in the construction of
different semantic categories. These studies have consistently
shown: (a) that visual information is evaluated as the domi-
nant feature in both living and non-living categories; (b) that
the next most relevant sources of information are other per-
ceptual data for the biological categories and body-related fea-
tures (actions and somatosensory data) for the artifact cate-
gories.
INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING THE NEURO-ANATOMICAL
CORRELATES OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CATEGORICAL
DISORDERS
From the neuro-anatomical point of view, data obtained by
studying evaluations of the weight of various kinds of infor-
mation in the representation of different conceptual categories
suggest that brain structures with a critical role in the representa-
tion of living and artifact categories might have a well-defined
cortical localization. Thus, the anterior parts of the temporal
lobes (where the ventral stream of visual processing converges
with auditory, olfactory, and gustatory inputs) should have a
critical role in the representation of biological entities. On the
other hand, the fronto-parietal, sensorimotor cortices (where
the dorsal stream of visual processing converges with body-
related and action-oriented structures) should have a major role
in the representation of artifacts. Furthermore, subjective eval-
uations of the weight of various kinds of information in the
representation of different conceptual categories suggest there
is a different degree of lateralization in the brain’s representa-
tion of animals, fruits and vegetables, and artifacts. The major
sources of knowledge about animals (i.e., visual and auditory
inputs) should, indeed, be bilaterally represented, whereas the
action-oriented structures, which provide an important source
of knowledge about artifacts (and to a lesser extent about fruits
and vegetables), should be mainly represented in the left hemi-
sphere, which controls the movements of the right side of the
body.
Both of these predictions have been confirmed by a number of
anatomo-clinical and neuroimaging studies.
Concerning the critical role played by lesions of the ante-
rior parts of the temporal lobes in semantic disorders for bio-
logical entities, several reviews of the anatomical correlates of
category-specific semantic disorders (e.g., Saffran and Schwartz,
1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Damasio et al., 1996; Tranel et al.,
1997a; Gainotti, 2000, 2005; Capitani et al., 2003) have shown
that brain structures located in the terminal parts of the ventral
stream of visual processing (such as the IT cortices) or responsi-
ble for integrating highly processed visual data with other sensory
modalities (such as the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices) are
usually disrupted in patients with category-specific semantic dis-
orders for living things. For example, Gainotti (2000) made a
detailed and systematic review of all available anatomo-clinical
reports of patients who presented a category-specific seman-
tic disorder for living things and artifacts and found bilateral
injury to the antero-mesial and inferior parts of the temporal
lobes (temporal pole, IT cortex, parahippocampal, perirhinal, and
entorhinal cortices) in almost all patients with a category-specific
semantic impairment for living things. Strauss et al. (2000) and
Luckhurst and Lloyd-Jones (2001) also reported similar data,
because they showed that temporal lobectomy patients were dis-
proportionately more impaired in naming living than non-living
things.
Data supporting this model were also reported by Grabowski
et al. (2001), Devlin et al. (2002), Tyler et al. (2004), Moss et al.
(2005), and Bright et al. (2005) in a series of neuroimaging
studies. These authors showed that the human perirhinal cortex
and neighboring anterior temporal structures provide the neural
infrastructure for living categories.
For example, Devlin et al. (2002) entered data from seven PET
studies into a single multifactorial design that crossed category
(living vs. man-made) with a range of tasks and found that liv-
ing things activated medial aspects of the anterior temporal poles
bilaterally and tools activated a left posterior middle temporal
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region. And Bright et al. (2005) reviewed recent neuropsycho-
logical and neuroimaging studies which showed that the human
perirhinal cortex and contiguous anteromedial temporal struc-
tures provide the neural infrastructure for making fine-grained
discriminations among objects, suggesting that damage in the
perirhinal cortex may underlie the emergence of category-specific
semantic deficits for living things.
Regarding artifacts, we see that lesions of a network involv-
ing the dorso-lateral part of the left frontal lobe, the left inferior
parietal lobe and the left middle temporal gyrus, where different
components of action schemata are represented (see Saygin et al.,
2004), provoke a prevalent impairment for tools and other man-
made artifacts, whose knowledge is mainly based on active manip-
ulation and physical contact with objects. This claim is supported
by the results of Gainotti’s (2000) above-mentioned systematic
review, which showed that an extensive lesion in areas located in
the dorso-lateral convexity of the left hemisphere was present in
all patients with a semantic impairment selectively affecting arti-
fact categories, and by other more recent reviews (e.g., Capitani
et al., 2003; Kellenbach et al., 2003; Gainotti, 2005; Buxbaum and
Kalénine, 2010; Campanella et al., 2010).
The systematic restriction of brain lesions to the left hemi-
sphere in patients with a category-specific disorder for artifacts
was confirmed in activation studies, conducted by Chao and Mar-
tin (2000), Gerlach et al. (2002), Kellenbach et al. (2003), and
Boronat et al. (2005), and in experiments of direct electrical
cortical stimulation, conducted by Ilmberger et al. (2002). For
example, Chao and Martin (2000) found that viewing and nam-
ing pictures of tools selectively activated the left ventral premotor
cortex. Boronat et al. (2005) obtained similar results when par-
ticipants viewed pairs of pictures or words denoting manipulable
objects and had to determine whether the objects were manipu-
lated the same way (M condition) or served the same function
(F condition). Significantly greater and more extensive activa-
tions in the left inferior parietal lobe occurred in the M than
the F condition. Finally, Ilmberger et al. (2002) used tool and
animal items to test the naming capabilities of epilepsy patients
with subdural electrodes implanted for localization of the epilep-
togenic zone and preoperative mapping of cognitive functions.
Results showed that during stimulation of the left hemisphere
naming disorders were more pronounced for tool items than
animal items.
The neuro-anatomical correlates of category-specific disorders
for fruits and vegetables show some features typical of animals
(i.e., importance of the anterior and mesial parts of the temporal
lobes) and other features typical of artifacts (i.e., left lateraliza-
tion). These findings, which were recently discussed by Capitani
et al. (2009), Gainotti (2010, 2011), and Capitani and Laiacona
(2011), are is in keeping with the results of investigations that
subjectively evaluated the weight of various kinds of information
in the representation of different conceptual categories. In fact,
in fruits and vegetables (as in animals) the most relevant sources
of information (after vision) are other perceptual data, whereas
in all artifact categories they consist of body-related actions and
somatosensory data. This explains the critical role of the anterior
and mesial parts of the temporal lobes in the representation of all
living categories. On the other hand, in the representation of fruits
and vegetables (as in those of artifacts, but not animals), specific
actions, such as peeling, cutting, and stirring, play an important
part, which may account for the shared left lateralization of both
artifacts and fruits and vegetables.
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THIS SECTION
Research on the neuro-anatomical correlates of various types of
categorical disorders has shown that the cortical areas damaged in
patients with a disorder selectively affecting a given category have
a critical role in processing the information that primarily con-
tributed to constructing the affected category. Thus, in patients
with a category-specific semantic disorder for biological entities,
lesions bilaterally affect the anterior parts of the temporal lobes
(where the ventral stream of visual processing converges with
auditory, olfactory, and gustatory inputs); and in patients with
a preferential impairment of the artifact categories lesions usually
affect the left-sided fronto-parietal, sensory-motor cortices (where
the dorsal stream of visual processing converges with body-related
and action-oriented structures). Taken together, both lines of
research suggest that body movements and somatosensory infor-
mation have a major role in the representation of artifacts (mainly
known through their manipulation), whereas visual and other per-
ceptual information has a dominant role in the representation of
animals and other living things.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The scope of the present review was ambitious; indeed, it aimed
to clarify the nature and format (abstract or sensory-motor) of
our conceptual representations. Both the psychological and the
anatomo-clinical data summarized in this survey seem to support
the sensory-motor (embodied) theory, because they show: (a) that
different perceptual and action-related features contribute to the
construction of different conceptual categories; (b) that psycho-
logical and anatomical data are consistent, because the cortical
areas affected in patients with category-specific semantic disor-
ders and activated during tasks involving the same categories play
a critical role in processing information that contributed to the
construction of the affected category.
These results indicate: (a) that the distinction between bio-
logical and artifact categories is not a primary one for the brain
and is not due to an “innate” categorical organization of con-
ceptual knowledge, as maintained by Caramazza and co-workers
(Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Caramazza
and Mahon, 2003); (b) that simple dichotomies, such as the
“living”/“non-living” distinction or the “SFT” cannot explain the
complexity of factors subsuming the brain’s representation of
different categories. On the contrary, the assumption that body-
related and environmental sources of knowledge experienced
through diverse sensory modalities play a different role in the con-
struction of different conceptual categories is consistent with the
subjective evaluation of normal subjects and the main functions
of cortical areas that have a critical role in the representation of
these categories. Nevertheless, the complexity of the experiential
factors and brain structures subsuming the brain’s representation
of different categories suggests that further investigations are nec-
essary to clarify the advantages and possible limitations of this
assumption.
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